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Abstract: This paper assesses the potential of the circular economy (CE) policy ambitions of the port
cities of Ghent (Belgium) and Amsterdam (The Netherlands). Both Ghent and Amsterdam are
municipalities that potentially lend themselves ideally to set up a more local-oriented circular
(re)production and (re)consumption system. Subsequently, both have the ambition that, in 2050,
the CE will have become an achieved public value that influences all activities to be more
circular in comparison with today. However, while having ambitious policies is important,
we explain that a public value also requires alignment with the operational capacity used or
needed to achieve this policy ambition. In this paper, we focus on the ‘negative’ CE operational
capacity: landfills and incinerators. Our results show that the CE ambitions of Ghent are more
realistic than Amsterdam. During the last few decades, Dutch waste management has been largely
privatized. This led to a significant increase in incinerator capacity and a lowering of the incineration
price. This differs from Flanders, which has a deliberate capping on the allowed incinerator capacity,
keeping the price for incineration high. This increases the incentive for urban and maritime actors to
climb the waste hierarchy, eventually thus making the port city (potentially) more circular as a whole.
Keywords: circular economy; port cities; public value; strategic management; incinerator capacity
1. Introduction
This paper assesses the potential of the circular economy (CE) policy ambitions of port cities,
specifically, the policy ambitions of their urban and their port authorities. To do so, it, however,
does not focus primarily on port cities, but on the institutional and socioeconomic structures they are
part of. We do this to avoid a bias towards success, in geography also known as the so-called ‘territorial
trap.’ Hereby, the outcome of the research is being predefined by the idealizing of a given territorial
bordered object [1]. Originally, the territorial trap was developed during the dawn of the post-cold
war globalization to criticize research using territorial variables to explain the (non-) success of states
to accommodate international businesses without focussing on the business itself or take into account
international relations that would shape territorial spaces [2]. Arguably, to assess the (non-) success
of the CE, the ‘danger’ of the bias towards success is relevant (again). Although the CE is a relatively
new concept, it has experienced an enormous hype among public and private actors [3,4]. The CE
is increasingly seen as one of the key strategic societal goals towards sustainable development [5].
While being a strategic goal in China since the late 1990s [6], more recently it has been adopted by
the United Nations [7], the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) [8]
and the European Union [9,10] among others. Within Europe, both Belgium (for this paper we focus
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on the region of Flanders) [11] and The Netherlands [12] have set the ambition to become fully circular
in 2050. All of these policies are, however, arguably difficult to assess, as they all in essence are the same:
having a full CE in 2050. Said otherwise, only in 2050 will we be able to assess the (non-) success
of the policies and their ambitions today. Therefore, to make it more concrete, policy reports or research,
e.g., [13], focus on best practices to assess the results of CE policy ambitions [14]. However, a recent
study in The Netherlands revealed that the best practices of CE innovations only represent a very small
amount of the total amount of CE innovations. The vast majority innovate the highest recycling activities
but no higher R-steps of the waste prevention hierarchy [15,16]. This is a concern, as in reality, the world
is increasingly less circular [17]. Today, 8.6% is circular of all materials (around 100 billion tonnes) used
per year, down from 9.1% two years ago because of an increase of extraction, the build-up of material
stocks, and low levels of end-of-use processing and cycling [18].
Here lies the territorial trap of the CE, whereby a conceptual error occurs regarding region or
cities as fixed units or containers, separated from outside political and socioeconomic spaces. If, then,
the (non-) success of circular policies of these spaces is used, the results are predefined (cf. [19]).
As such, the more or less amount of successful CE stories defines then how a government is performing,
(implicitly), thus favouring individual (mostly subsidized) efforts instead of more overall adjustments
regarding the CE. This makes it also difficult to objectively compare administrative areas regarding
their efforts to strive towards a CE. Moreover, as agenda-setting theories have pointed out [20], as such,
the uncritical discourse of circular success stories can even be used by policy actors as a strategy to
push particular agendas to the front at the expense of others [21,22].
In this paper, the research objective was to assess the (potential) success of circular policy
ambitions without focusing on the (successful) projects themselves. Our hypothesis was that focussing
on success stories blurs our understanding of the actual situation of the CE of a certain region or city.
Therefore, in contrast, we assessed circular policy ambitions by analysing what their potential is to
effectively let the CE emerge as a public value. Thus, to become more circular, in comparison with
the current situation, this requires influencing all activities and not only creating a few success stories
within or linked to the administrative responsible area or structure [23]. Our focus is on the lowest
administrative level, namely, the municipal level. In particular, we focus on port cities, municipalities
characterized by an economy centring on knowledge and industrial logistical economy [24]. We focus
on these, because our proposition is that they have particular contexts that potentially lend themselves
better to adapt (more) a CE. Next, to avoiding the use of primary materials, it is assumed that the CE
also will strive towards a (re)production and (re)consumption system or paradigm [25] that remains as
local as possible [26,27]. Therefore, if successful, the CE will most likely be characterized by a ‘glocal’
system [28], whereby global (re)production networks will keep on existing [29,30], but with a more
(sustainable) balance departing from the local level. What is more, translating the CE of 2050 back
to the policy choices today, urban regions having the space for and/or are already hosting industrial
(re)production or logistical functions, have a higher potential to adapt to a CE in comparison with urban
regions which, today, do not have the space and/or industrial (re)production or logistical functions.
The assumption here is that existing residential, agricultural, or nature land use will not (all) be
transformed into industrial land use. However, this is of course only the CE potential of matching
(re)production and (re)consumption, understood in geographical economic terms. In a reciprocal
way, this is also the opportunistic reason why many port cities’ authorities, the local and the port
authorities, put the CE as their central competitive ambition and are trying to let the CE emerge as
a public value that defines all activities within, towards, and from their urban/maritime economies.
However, in spatial terms, as described by Van den Berghe and Vos [22], the CE ambitions of the local
authorities and the port authorities can conflict within the same port city. In Amsterdam, currently
a land use conflict exists between port and city to transform an existing maritime area into a residential
area, although both use the discourse of circularity to claim their ‘right’ on that particular area.
The urban government links circularity to the built environment, stating that all new built buildings
will be circular, consequently helping to achieve its CE ambitions. The port authorities link circularity to
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(re)production processes and the need of such functions to be located as close as possible to the city [22].
In other words, the higher potential of port cities to adapt to a CE, understood in geographical economic
terms, is not (always) the same perspective on CE from some policy-makers within port cities.
The remaining of this paper is as follows. First, we will introduce the concept of public value
and how it is constituted by its legitimacy and operational capacity. Legitimacy is understood as the legal
and policy context, while the operational capacity is understood in this paper as the industrial/physical
production capacity. The public value concept lends itself ideally to assess how the circular policy
ambitions (legitimacy) are aligned or not with the existing operational capacity. In other words, as
such, we are able to link policy of the CE with the economic/technical side of the CE, two ‘parts
of the CE’ that are mostly not linked to each other [25]. The (non-) alignment between the two
then informs us of the potential of the policy ambitions to let the CE emerge as a public value,
eventually thus influencing all activities to become more circular. The third section explains our
operational framework. In our results, we map the legitimacy and support, or the circular policies
and their ambitions, and the operational capacity of the CE. As we will explain, we assess the latter
by looking at the ‘negative’ CE operational capacity, or the operational capacity of incinerators
in Flanders (Ghent) and The Netherlands (Amsterdam). In our discussion, we will show how
in Flanders the local-to-regional CE ambitions are better aligned with the operational capacity of the CE,
while in The Netherlands a lock-in is created that hinders a CE that is able to go beyond the incineration
or recover level. Based on our results, we conclude with policy recommendations towards the local
and regional strategic CE management of the port cities of Ghent and Amsterdam.
2. The Circular Economy as Public Value
2.1. The Public Value Concept
The public value concept was coined by Moore [31] and is an organizing principle focusing
originally on public sector organizations but has become more widely used. Public value describes
the value that an organization contributes to the society. It can be the result from improving
the government itself as an asset to society, or it can be the result from the delivery of specific benefits
to the people. Moore saw public value as the equivalent of the shareholder value sought by the private
sector, whereby public organizations seek public value, rewarded in an arguably similar way as
pursuing shareholder value. Moore used public value as a ‘counterweight’ for the then widely applied
New Public Management approach.
New Public Management (NPM) emerged in the United Kingdom during the Thatcher and Major
governments in the 1980s and 1990s, subsequently adapted in many different ways around the world [32].
In general, it focuses on using approaches from the private sector in public management. The basic
idea is that a government outsources a number of its tasks via competitive contracting, increasing
the efficiency and the quality of the public service delivery and leading to an increased value for
the taxpayers’ money. It is considered that the private sector, motivated by market incentives, is better
capable of efficiently delivering a number of public services, within the conditions set by government.
The public administration itself should thus insist on accountability, supported by methods such as tools
as performance-based budgeting. This then results in reducing governments in search of their most
effective size and shape, accomplished through strategic reviews, consolidation, and reorganisation
and leaving those tasks to the market to which the market is best equipped.
From a democratic point of view, NPM creates, in theory, more transparency and a better
understanding of how the government spends public money. Central to NPM is, namely, the use
of performance measurement systems that enhance the legitimacy and accountability of government
operations. Consequently, based on these analyses, one should be able to detect if a government
performance is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ based on predefined criteria. However, this is the case in theory.
The challenge is to operationalize this. As explained by Moore [33], at first, the need for objective
measures seems to be a technical one to measure the success—or not—of public organizations in altering
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social conditions in order to create public value. However, in turn, it becomes a managerial problem
as to how to deploy such technical tools in combination with day-to-day activities in organizations;
for example, how to hold someone accountable for their performance? At that point, it exposes
a political problem: what is the value that is pursued?
2.2. The Lack of Strategic Management can Constrain Sustainable Development
The main limitation of NPM is the difficulty, or even impossibility, to attribute observed changes
in social conditions. Causality is difficult to observe due to the many intervening variables. In addition,
in many cases, changes need a long time before they visibly emerge. The feedback comes in late,
which makes it little verifiable to relate change to the daily operations and adjust and improve
them if needed. Consequently, the NPM focus on measuring results to improve the accountability
led not to a predicted ‘creative destruction’ [34] of inefficient and ineffective public services, but to
a defensive behaviour of public agencies and to an endless discussion on the definition of public
value. With, amongst others, its ill-defined character and absence of agreed-upon evaluation criteria,
the NPM concept qualifies as a ‘wicked problem’ [35]. The result of this all was that, rather than
focusing on solving societal problems, public agencies started to focus on justifying past performance,
leading to stronger institutional inertia instead of change. Such reinforcing feedback mechanisms
leading to institutional lock-in and reduced or absence of organisational responsibility for collectively
produced outcomes have also been observed by Ulrich Beck in his work on the ‘risk society’ [36].
Following this, one crucial element of private agencies’ behaviour did not immediately find its way
to public governance, namely, strategic management [33]. Strategic management has been developed
in the business world to guide the often-by-scenarios driven decision-making of private-sector firms [37].
Nonetheless, strategic management was incorporated in public management, albeit in a slightly
different way [38]. Strategic management in public governance does not focus on the uncertain
risks. In contrary to private policy-making, it focuses on a desired future, giving attention to
the aspects that are controllable and less the external complex and dynamic environment that
influences development [33,39].
Especially for sustainable development, taking into account the external complex
and dynamic environment, when aiming to achieve a desired future, is important.
Sustainable development—thus also the CE as its ‘newest’ concept—requires strong strategic
management, combining the private- and public-sector understanding of this instrument.
Contributing to changes in the long term requires the alignment of different stakes in the short
term and the long term. However, as explained by Boons and Spekkink [40], in many countries,
the responsibility for sustainable development, in light of NPM, has since the 1980s been externalised
for a large part to the private sector. Hereby, the role of the government has evolved to
the facilitator of transformation, setting the long-term goals, while market mechanisms were expected
to incentivize private parties in making the changes needed to achieve the goals. The private-sector
and market-dominated process poses a challenge for the strategic management of sustainable
development for public governments, as they are not (anymore) directly in control of the effective
(re)production capacities.
3. Operational Framework
To guide public managers in a complex and dynamic environment, Moore [31] introduced
his strategic triangle. The strategic triangle informs public managers as to how to create
public value by successfully aligning the sources of legitimacy and support of the public value
and the operational capacity. Within the triangle lies then the strategic management, or the area
of control of the decision-makers (Figure 1).
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Figure 1. The Strategic Triangle (Moore [31])
In this paper, we regard the CE as a public value that, however, is ‘still in the making.’ While a lot
of attention has already been given to describing the legitimacy and support of the CE, especially during
recent years (cf. [41]), arguably less attention has been given to the operational capacity to enhance
a CE. Moore [31] defines the operational capacity as the developed capacity to achieve the desired
result. Translated to the CE, we understand the operational capacity thus as the capacity within
a given location, in this case Ghent (Flanders) and Amsterdam (The Netherlands), that can enable
activities to become (more) circular. While these activities can be also software or orgware, in this
paper we focus on the hardware operational capacity, understood as the technical capacity to make
existing production and consumption processes more circular. Moore’s triangle thus enables us to link
the political and public administrative side of the CE with the operational capacity, which is an economic
and technical view on the CE. In other words, the triangle checks if the policy ambitions are in line
with the existing economic operational capacity. If the legitimacy and operational capacity is aligned,
according to Moore [31], a public value can emerge. However, methodologically, it is arguably
impossible to assess the operational capacity of the CE. Every product has different parts, which have,
again, different applications and require different (re)production processes. In addition, in geography
and time, these differ significantly. Therefore, we take into account the non-, or negative-operational
capacity of the CE, based on the ladder of Lansink (Figure 2).
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Different from the ‘positive’ CE operational capacity, the ‘negative’ operational capacity is the same
for all products and materials: all materials or waste that are sent to a landfill or are being incinerated
cannot be recycled or reused. Otherwise stated, landfills and incinerators can be seen as the CE’s
negative operational capacity, arguably thus producing a negative circular public value. Note that
many incinerators also generate (‘green’) energy, given that waste-to-energy solutions have been
considered to deliver ‘green’ energy according to the European directives on renewable energy and on
biomass [42]. We, however, take incinerators into account that burn all kinds of waste, or residual waste,
including biomass. Biomass that is collected separately, is being exclusively gassed and/or incinerated to
generate energy, is here not included and can be regarded as a ‘grey zone’ for sustainable development
(Figure 2). Nonetheless, we are aware of the contested status given the many perverse incentives that
possibly annihilate the reduction of the environmental impact; for example, by growing forests for
incineration or by importing bio-waste, thus generating transport-related emissions and impact [43].
To assess the current public value of CE, we will map the (un)alignment between the CE public
management legitimacy and support, and the economic and technical CE negative operational
capacity. We focus hereby on the port cities of Ghent and Amsterdam, respectively in Flanders
(Belgium) and The Netherlands. We have chosen these two port cities because, first, both
Flanders and The Netherlands are seen as forerunners in waste management within Europe [44,45].
Second, while both the cities of Ghent and Amsterdam have stated clear circular policy ambitions
for their urban economies, also their ports—and thus their port authorities—have put the CE as
a central policy ambition for their maritime economies. Third, arguably, port cities are administrative
regions or municipalities wherein both (re)consumption and (re)production can (potentially) be
organised. Internationally, in general, two main categories of waste are distinguished: household
waste and company waste. Within port cities, these two categories are present in significant amounts.
Fourth, in regard to a full CE, port cities can potentially become places were thus (re)consumption
and (re)production is better aligned, an argument that is today already used within the discourse
of the port of Amsterdam to safeguard its license to operate [22]. Summarized, port cities can offer
a lens on the challenges between the alignment of CE policy ambitions and the CE operational capacity
to facilitate this. We base our analysis on a historical analysis of the waste management in Flanders
and The Netherlands, eventually assessing Moore’s triangle today.
4. Results
4.1. The EU Waste Reduction Policies
The European Commission (EC) has a long tradition on regulating waste and supporting recycling
activities. For municipal waste (MSW) the important directives are the Packaging and Packaging Waste
Directive (94/62/EC) [46], the Landfill Directive (1999/31/EC) [47], the Directive on the incineration
of waste (2000/76/EC) [48], and the Waste Framework Directive (WFD, 2008/98/EC) [49]. The latter sets
the bar of minimum 50% recycling, increased to 60% by 2025 and 65% by 2030, in its 2015 report [10].
Nonetheless, discrepancies in their implementation and the Union’s aspiration to become more circular
by the middle of this century, made an amendment of WFD needed. Perhaps, one of the main reasons
for a Directive change was the Waste-to-Energy debate on its role in the CE. While the WFD resorts
on Lansink’s ladder, some authors and organizations (e.g., Zero Waste Europe, Global Alliance for
Incinerator Alternatives) believed that much more attention was put on incineration than on waste
prevention and recycling [50]. Proof of this is that the EC highlights the opportunities for energy
recovery through incineration in its Science Hub, through an article by Scarlat et al. [51] setting
the potential for almost 250 new incineration and co-firing plants in Europe. Directive 2018/851/EC [52]
came to amend the WFD with the aim of transforming current European’s waste management into
sustainable material management, providing a definition of material recovery apart from energy
recovery, and, among other measures, seeks to avoid support to landfilling and incineration among
local and regional authorities. Likewise, the European Green Deal [53] privileges the opportunity to
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expand sustainable and job-intense economic activities, sustainable product policies with the potential
of significant waste reduction, and the stimulation of a potential lead market by developing new
technologies and sustainable innovative solutions to waste.
4.2. Flanders-Ghent
The institutional waste landscape in Belgium is regionalized (cf. Flanders, Brussels, and Wallonia).
First, for household waste, every region is responsible for the waste plans, while—as in most European
countries—municipalities are responsible for the collection and treatment. During the second half
of the 20th century, municipalities increasingly experienced difficulties to cope with the growing
amount of waste [54]. There were several reasons for this. First, the increased use of artificial fertilizers
in the agriculture sector turned human, animal, and organic waste useless. Second, increasingly
gas and gasoline were used to centrally heat buildings, making families let go of their ‘individual’
waste-to-energy: their fireplaces. Third, the increasing consumption society resulted in an increase
of plastics and packaging materials that not only increased the amount of waste, but also became
mixed with other (re)usable waste, thus making it all unusable. This resulted eventually on its
top during the 1970s, in around 250 kg residual, or unusable, waste per capita per year—in total
1.5 million tonnes—that was generated in Flanders [54]. At that time, there was almost no treatment
opportunity for this residual waste. The standard procedure was to dump the waste into large landfills
or to (non-filtered) incinerate it, only sporadic with waste-to-energy. From the beginning of the 1970s,
the Belgian state increasingly started to subsidise incinerators. An important reason was the oil crisis,
which made waste-to-energy more lucrative [54]. Incinerators remained, however, more expensive than
landfills. Within Flanders/Belgium, numerous landfills existed and, although there were protests [54],
they remained an important destination for national and international waste. Illustrative is that,
in 1979, the municipality of Amsterdam intended to dump 400,000 tonnes of household residual waste
in the municipality of Rupel [54], which was eventually cancelled [54]. Eventually, in 1983, it was
forbidden to use the Flemish landfills for non-Flemish waste. However, since waste is regionalized
in Belgium, for years, Dutch residual waste was landfilled in Wallonia [54,55].
From the mid-1970s, the first separate waste collections were organised. Following the European
directive on waste [56], also Belgium, and thus Flanders, had to come up with a waste plan.
Because of the political restructuring of Belgium, the Flemish decree on Waste Products eventually came
into force in 1985 [57] and became renewed every five years [54]. This first plan focused on regulating,
closing, and cleaning the existing numerous landfills (in 1983 there were 455 landfills, of which only
one-third had a permission, [54]) to optimize the use of incinerators and to increase the separate
collection of waste. During the 1980s, the total of household waste, from which first 31% was combusted
and 44% went to a landfill, changed to 55% and 20%, respectively [54].
In 2018, on average 468.5 kg per person per year was collected in Flanders. Of this household
waste, 68.9% (up from 10% in 1988, [54]) was recycled (44.2%) or composted (21.5%). This resulted
in 145.6 kg per person per year as residual waste [58]. Of this residual waste, after, for example,
sand is separated, 91.3% is incinerated with energy recuperation (30% of the total amount of waste).
Among the residual waste, more than half (56%) is still recyclable or compostable [58]. Hence, to further
encourage the municipalities to increase the prevention and the separate collection of waste, the Flemish
Public Department of Waste (OVAM) has set the bar on average in Flanders to 138 kg per person per
year in 2022 [59].
Next to household waste, there is company waste. For a long time, company waste did not
receive any attention as the economy prevailed over ecology. However, during the 1970s, especially
the treatment of the enormous quantities of often-dangerous industrial waste became an important
political debate in Flanders. Until then, in most cases, industrial waste was being dumped on land
or in the sea or being incinerated on land or via large incinerator ships. If this was not possible,
industrial waste was exported. However, the European Union started to forbid dangerous waste being
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transported across borders (finalized in [60]). Similarly to household waste, company waste treatment
became a mandatory aspect, and to date, it is being separated into reusable and residual waste.
In Flanders, the total household waste in 2018 was 3,087,209 tonnes (Figure 3). Of this, 959,204 t
were household residual waste (around 70% is thus at least recycled). After another legal specification
of waste handling, for example, the exclusion of sand and other non-flammable elements, 91.3%, or
around 876,000 tonnes went to an incinerator [58]. Annually, around 8 million tonnes of company
waste are generated (2016: 8.2 Mtonnes) [61]. Around 85% is reused, thus higher than for household
waste, while around 15% is incinerated or landfilled (881,036 tonnes). While the household residual
waste had decreased from 1,016,604 tonnes in comparison with 2013, company residual waste saw
an increase of 5.8%. Even corrected with the increased employment, relatively, company residual
waste increased, implementing that it has to decrease by 15% towards the 2022 goal. OVAM [58] did
an analysis on the company residual waste and found that around 44% of the waste could be reused.
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Figure 3. The total and deviation of amount of incinerated waste and landfill in Flanders,
and the evolution of the prices for incineration in Flanders (figure: authors). Note that these
prices are a combination of taxes (around 10%) and operational costs. For company residual waste,
the prices are a combination of the two prices for low and high calorific waste [62].
In total, taking also into account other smaller residues, there was a total supply
of almost 2 million tonnes (1,978,224 tonnes) of waste that could be incinerated in 2018. This is higher
than the available incinerator capacity in Flanders, which is 1,867,754 tonnes. In other words, within
Flanders, in 2018, there was a shortage of around 80,000 tonnes incinerator capacity [62]. This deficit
is being exported or (temporally) sent to a landfill (Figure 3). In 2020, an extra 100,000 tonnes capacity
will be opened, which, in other words, will imply that the total supply of household and company
waste is approximately the same as the capacity of incinerators in Flanders. OVAM, via the Flemish
Government, actively controls the total capacity of incinerators in Flanders [59]. The basic idea here
is to encourage separating and reusing waste, and only in a last stepping to combust it [54]. By capping,
and gradually lowering, the incinerator capacity in Flanders, the prices for incineration are deliberately
kept relatively high (Figure 3), to thus encourage higher steps on the ladder of Lansink.
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Ghent is a port city located in the west of Flanders. The city hosts around 250,000 inhabitants.
In 2018, the port of Ghent merged with the Dutch port of Zeeland, creating the European North
Sea Port (NSP) port authority. Both the city as well as the port authority have stated their circular
ambitions [63–65]. First, the city of Ghent has put the CE as an inclusive resilient future of its urban
economy that is able to lead the transition of its employment structure. Under this umbrella, it has
put six themes to the forefront: mobility/logistics, circular building, water, materials, food, and local
production. In general, the city of Ghent plans to achieve a CE whereby materials are reused as
much as possible, combining a network view (of actors and materials) with a geographical view
(to keep it as local as possible) [65]. Moreover, Ghent explicitly states that it wants to become a ‘glocal’
production place, whereby as much as possible is produced locally, with global import and export
where needed [64]. Ghent operates its own incinerator where it combusts the residual waste of its
inhabitants. The incinerator has a capacity of 100,000 tonnes per year that generates heat and electricity
for its own purposes as well as for a nearby hospital. The capacity is sufficient to process the residual
waste of Ghent and several neighbouring municipalities [54].
Second, the North Sea Port has an overall sustainable strategy to strive for climate neutrality
of 50% in 2030 and 100% in 2050 [63]. To achieve this, it prioritizes four strategies: (i) sustainable energy
production, (ii) the use of hydrogen, (iii) circular production, and (iv) the storage and use of CO2.
In practice, on the one hand, the NSP is a partner, with the city of Ghent among others, of the Cleantech
Cluster Ghent, wherein via subsidies and projects circular practices are subsidised. On the other hand,
the NSP will further extend its Flemish/Dutch pipeline infrastructure within its port area and towards
the hinterland, whereby both materials as energetic products (e.g., CO2, H2) can be exchanged [66].
4.3. The Netherlands/Amsterdam
During the 20th century, similar to Belgium and many other countries, waste treatment
was the responsibility of local municipalities. The dominant processing of waste was via
landfills. However, following the increased economic activity, the amount of waste grew and also
the contamination of it by synthetic products [67]. During the 1970s, the ecological cost and the impact
on our planet became higher on the agenda, notably by the Club of Rome [68]. Within the European
Union, The Netherlands, arguably, took a leading role in the regulation of the waste sector. Illustrative
is that parliament member Ad Lansink became linked to the then-introduced ‘ladder of Lansink’
(Figure 2), which is yet much referred to as a leading principle for sustainable development [55].
Therefore, this is different from Belgium. The Netherlands, some ten years earlier, in 1979, introduced
laws regulating chemical and regular waste. Consequently, it became very difficult to keep on using
landfills. As these laws did forbid the import of waste—the opposite of today—they did not forbid
the export of waste. Thus, since the landfills in Flanders were not yet strictly regulated, soon a significant
flow of residual waste was transported from The Netherlands to Flanders and, after 1983 until the 1990s,
to Wallonia [54,67].
During the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, a significant restructuring took place of the Dutch
waste infrastructure. The main concern was to better organize the waste processing capacity of Dutch
waste, instead of exporting it to other countries (e.g., Belgium). Therefore, a significant increase of public
investments in incinerators took place, and the responsibility became centralised to the national level.
In 2018, 8.5 million tonnes of household waste were collected. This results in 494 kg per inhabitant
per year, a decrease of around 60 kg since 2008; 206 kg consisted of residual waste (34.8%), 288 kg
were collected separately (65.2%). Absolutely and relatively, these figures per capita are comparable
with Flanders. In total, around 3 million tonnes of household waste annually were combusted [69].
Next, around 4.5 million tonnes of company residual waste were combusted in 2018 [70]. Different
from Flanders, no combustible residual waste was sent to landfills (Figure 4).
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(figure: authors, data from [70]).
The reason for this is because the incinerator capacity in The Netherlands is significantly higher
than the supply of combustible waste. While in 1980 the incinerator capacity was 2.2 million tonnes,
this increased to almost 8 million tonnes today [55]. (Figure 5). The increase of incinerator capacity
was needed to prevent the growing amount of waste from being landfilled. Especially by the end
of the 1990s, new incinerator technologies were introduced to further reduce the emissions through
placing filters and optimising the e ergy recover of the plants. In addition, the Dutch Government
encouraged e use of the residuals to make concrete, especi lly for r ad and infrastructure constructions.
From the 1980s to the beginning of th 21st ce tury, the incinerato capacity doubled [67].
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From the beginning of the 21st century, an important shift occurred in the Dutch waste policy [55].
Waste became regarded as a valuable economic good. While this was derived in the first place from
an ecological point of view, a consequence was also that the waste became an economic market
and, as all other economic markets, should have its own (inter)national regulations and privatized
companies. This led to the fact that, in 2006, it was allowed that non-Dutch waste could be imported,
while until now, exporting waste is still taxed highly. Thus, the waste management of The Netherlands
became linked with the waste management of other countries. As explained by [67], the situation
in the 2000s was that The Netherlands had chosen incinerators and re-use as the main options; Belgium
focused on consumers and recycling, and the United Kingdom for landfilling.
During the last decade, a lot has changed. First, in The Netherlands, the amount of combustible
waste kept on decreasing and is supposed to decrease towards 5 million tonnes in 2022. At the same
time, the incinerator capacity kept on growing. This led to two intertwined effects. First, an overcapacity
of incinerators illustrated that, since 2010, 1 million tonnes capacity has been added. Since incinerator
plants need a minimal operational flow of waste, foremost waste from the United Kingdom is today
imported to The Netherlands, around 1.5 million tonnes today. Remarkable is that, during the beginning
of the 2010s, within policy reports this was perceived environmentally positively [71]. This was based
on the difference of environmental effects of or sending waste to landfills in the United Kingdom
or transporting this waste to The Netherlands towards its incinerators; the latter thus being more
environmental positive than the former. Without going further into that in this paper, this changing
point of view is a consequence of taking into account or not the effect of ‘problem displacement’ [25],
or here, arguably, the opposite ‘problem inclusion.’ While with problem displacement there
is a lack of responsibility to tackle the (environmental) problem, here one is dependent on the lack
of responsibility of another actor. Second, the price of incineration decreased significantly, from around
100 euros per tonne in 2010 to around 65 euros per tonne today (Figure 5). This is significantly lower
than in Flanders.
Arguably, within The Netherlands, the port and city of Amsterdam are leading in terms of CE
ambitions. Already in 2015, the city of Amsterdam launched its circular plan, which has been renewed
in 2020 [72,73]. The city has appointed three focus areas: food and organic flows, consumption
goods, and the built environment. These are three of the five focus areas appointed by the Dutch
Government [12]. Of these five, the industrial sector and plastics are not appointed as a priority for
the city of Amsterdam [72]. The port authority of Amsterdam has put the CE as part of its central
strategy since 2016 [74]. Since then, CE has only become more important for the port authority within
its strategy, albeit this is part of its strategy to defend its license to operate following the particular
situation with the city of Amsterdam regarding a land use conflict between maritime and urban land
use [75,76]. Remarkably, this land use conflict is using on both sides the CE discourse, albeit different
‘parts’ of the CE are chosen [22]. The city authority, aiming to redevelop an existing maritime area close
to the city into a new residential area, uses circularity within its plans linked to the built environment.
Their reasoning is that the new built area will be constructed in a circular way (e.g., design, material use)
that will help to achieve its CE ambitions. The port authority, though, uses circularity understood
in (re)production processes. They claim that the area under discussion is needed to host circular
functions (e.g., waste treatment) that are located as close as possible to the city; this to avoid thus
the effect of ‘problem displacement’ [25,26].
5. Discussion
Using this triangle as a framework, we can now bring our results together (Figure 6). Our results
show that, arguably, Flanders and The Netherlands in terms of waste management have switched
positions recently. The Netherlands, with their early national waste management plans, were during
the 1970s and 1980s a forerunner in terms of sustainable development. Illustrative for this is that
their national ladder of Lansink became also an internationally known strategic and policy tool
for short- and long-term environmental policy [27]. While at that time the incinerator capacity
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in The Netherlands was not sufficient, significant flows of waste were sent to landfills in Flanders
and later to Belgium. This shows that, in Flanders, ecology was not high on the policy agenda,
and the (linear) economy prevailed.
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During the 1990 , Flanders gradually caught up with The Netherlands. Incinerators were
built and modernised, and, at the same time, attention was given to recycling and reuse.
Nonetheless, the amount of waste kept on growing, both in Flanders and in The Netherlands, following
the increased economic activity and the growth of population. However, landfills gradually were closed,
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and, in both Flanders and The Netherlands, relatively more waste was recycled, with incineration and,
finally, landfill as last resorts.
The Legacy of an Internationally Oriented New Public Management Hinders a Balanced Local-Oriented
CE Triangle
This brings us to the centre of the triangle of Moore [31]: strategic management. As explained,
to successfully create a public value, one needs to align the legitimacy and support with the operational
capacity—hence the strategic management. In light of creating the CE as a public value, two essential
aspects are needed: (i) the recycling, reuse, or refuse of materials, and (ii) striving to do these as
local as possible. The first aspect is used to foster innovation and increased employment [15,34]
in the existing activities or to attract non-existing activities and employment in that particular region.
The second is used to link this to the spatial planning of such innovative CE. Both aspects explain to
some level—next to for example climate change goals—why many local administrative governments,
like port cities, put the CE as a central policy ambition for their economies. This will demand,
especially in The Netherlands, a difficult transition. With the dawn of the 21st century, The Netherlands
had optimized their waste management. At this moment, an arguably lock-in emerged that focussed
on waste incineration. We understand lock-in here as the situation whereby two systems, in this case
waste management and waste treatment, are so much linked to each other that the situation in one
of the systems hinders, or locks, the other one from evolving. This lock-in between the ladder of Lansink
and the incinerator capacity explains why the strategic management towards a CE of the port city
of Amsterdam is more limited than the one of the port city of Ghent. The lock-in of Amsterdam can be
linked to two main reasons. First, increasingly the European environmental ambitions were heightened.
In particular, the European Commission raised its ambitions on renewable energy sources (RES) for
electricity (RES-E) and transport (RES-T). According to Hoppe and van Bueren [77], Dutch shares
of RES were disappointing compared to the Union’s ambitions, for the Dutch electricity system
is “best described as a fossil-based thermal system, dominated by inexpensive natural gas and coal
as main production sources” (p. 67). Likewise, the modest target of 9% by 2010 and 17% in 2020
of the Directive 2001/77/EC [78] on RES-E was not seen as a threat, since RES-E was produced from
biomass and different types of waste were considered as such. The latter brings us to the second
main reason. From the beginning of the 2000s, The Netherlands—in line with NPM—began to see
waste as an economic good and incinerators as assets that could be financially break-even and rely
on forms of self-regulation within the regulatory framework set by central and local governments.
This created an internationally oriented incinerator market in The Netherlands. In other words,
the NPM principles here got mixed with the sustainable goals of waste-to-energy as an ideal win-win
solution: manage waste, while increasing the share of ‘green’ energy, as demanded by the EU.
This is in contrast to Flanders, where the capping of the maximum allowed amount of incinerator
capacity was deliberately kept low, and from 2022 even will decrease. The prices to incinerate
are therefore significantly higher in Flanders than in The Netherlands, especially during the last
decade. The lock-in in The Netherlands has even increased, as more and more waste-to-energy
incinerators have been connected to heat networks, also to decrease the use of natural gas.
Consequently, there is an increasing demand of this type of generated heat, thus an increased
need to combust waste. This makes the (local) energy system dependent on waste combustion.
More recently, this became a greater challenge, because, as in the rest of Europe, increasingly the CE
is embraced, and thus the prevention of waste is strived for. Already in the figures, it can be seen that
the total amount of residual waste is decreasing. Therefore, not only because of the increased capacity
of incinerators, but also of the increased link with local heating networks, The Netherlands has to
import waste.
To summarize, if one wants to assist the (potential of) local CE strategic management, one should
analyse how the triangle is (un)aligned (Figure 7). Only in this way, the potential of a CE within a port
city, and thus the (re)connection of port and city, could be achieved. Essential for a CE is that materials
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are at least recycled, but also remain as local as possible. Such localization requires not only dedicated
and consistent regulative frameworks across scales and sectors, but also an operational capacity
that is not (only) aimed at optimizing economic drivers, but also takes into account the ecological
aspects of these.
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6. Conclusions
This paper focussed on the potential of the CE strategic management of local port cities,
by not focusing on them in the first place. Local authorities, in cases such as the port cities of Ghent
and Amsterdam, have increasingly put forward the CE as their core future socioeconomic business
model. Similar to other concepts in the past, increasingly, policy documents and ambitions are
formulated in this field. Arguably, Amsterdam is seen as an (international) forerunner, both the urban
government as the port authority, following their clearly stated ambitions and regulations (cf. [79]).
As explained by Moore [31], it is, however, also necessary that these policy ambitions are aligned with
the operational capacity to enable the emergence of the CE as (local) public value. In other words,
urban regions which have the space for and/or already host industrial (re)production or logistical
functions, have a higher potential to adapt to a CE compared to urban regions which, to date, do not
have the space and/or industrial (re)production or logistical functions.
Our results show that, in this respect, the CE policy ambitions of Ghent are more realistic
than those of Amsterdam. In The Netherlands, in light of NPM, the waste management sector
has developed towards an internationally oriented incinerator sector, competing on market prices.
During the last decade, the capacity of incinerators has increased, while the price has decreased
significantly. In addition, increasingly the incinerators have been linked to waste-to-energy heat
networks, creating all together a lock-in between waste management and waste treatment, resulting
in that the ladder of Lansink ‘is stuck on’ the incinerator step.
Bringing this back to Amsterdam, in reality, it is increasingly relatively more expensive to
recycle, reuse, or refuse materials, than to incinerate waste. Thus, if at least circular programs
are not subsidised or increasingly other factors (e.g., social and/or environmental externalities) are
taken into account within the price, the circular business models of Amsterdam-based companies
and organisations—and thus also the overall circular ambition of the port city of Amsterdam—, are less
realistic compared to Ghent’s. In Flanders, the incinerator capacity is capped and decreasing, keeping
the incinerator price high to make recycling, reusing, or refusing more interesting over incineration.
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This will only become more if social and/or environmental externalities (e.g., CO2) are taken into
account. If the legal framework and support are further improved (e.g., making it fiscally more
interesting to reuse materials, create ‘circular labels’), the operational capacity to enhance the CE
(e.g., clusters) is more likely to happen.
Such context holds important policy recommendations for port cities and other governmental
organisations. Creating a CE is not only about posing ambitious circular goals or to put all efforts
in a successful story that lends itself ideally for marketing. The real challenge is to align the existing
circular operational framework with these ambitions, fostering changes in the systems of production
and consumption at operational levels rather than changes over the whole system, or transitions usually
urged for. Especially for ports and their port authorities, that host international companies thriving
on global production and supply chains, it is a challenge to help transit their business case towards
locally recycling, reusing, or refusing of materials as much as possible. While much attention now goes
to the ‘positive’ circular operational capacity such as establishing pipelines or altered (re)production
processes, another way is to decrease the ‘negative’ circular operational capacity such as landfills
and incinerators and thus decrease the ‘negative’ circular public value. If this is done, the incentive to,
first, move up on the ladder of Lansink and, second, to remain as local as possible, will become bigger,
therefore the potential of the policy ambition to let the CE emerge as a local public value.
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